

## The gift of being needed

### Protestantism and the double-edged sword of hospitality

*Thomas Hylland Eriksen*

---

Fire he needs  
who with frozen knees  
Has come from the cold without  
Food and clothes  
must the farer have,  
The man from the mountains come  
Water and towels  
and welcoming speech  
Should he find who comes, to the feast  
Bellows 30, *Hávamál*

### The disgraceful host

In the space of just a few weeks, the Coronavirus pandemic seemed to change almost every aspect of the world as we used to know it. From the norms of social distancing to the collapse of the global tourist industry; from the restrictions placed on personal mobility to the closure of restaurants; from the digitalization of work to the disappearance of public events, the implications of the pandemic reshaped everyday life just as it thrust the capitalist world economy into a deep recession.

The new situation also had serious consequences for the practices of hospitality in most of its dimensions. People could no longer organize informal meetings, meals, or parties like in the past. Refugee centers were closed indefinitely. Border controls were stepped up, making entry into European countries even more difficult than earlier; and on the other side of the Mediterranean, refugee camps were understaffed with limited services, their residents stuck to an even greater extent than earlier. Offering and receiving hospitality in a world where strangers

represent a potential threat is no easy task. This chapter does not analyze the changing character of hospitality owing to the onset of the Coronavirus crisis, but the intensification of othering, the strengthening of state surveillance, and the increased securitization of borders form a necessary backdrop. I examine hospitality in a Nordic context, and although the virus pandemic is not the foreground to this contribution, it is a necessary background to the analysis that follows. An underlying question concerns the extent to which the practices and values of hospitality are being reshaped by the critical situation in which we have found ourselves since March 2020.

Hospitality is a cultural value everywhere, although it is managed and understood differently from place to place. Who is deemed a worthy recipient of hospitality varies from everyone to people who are “like us”; the duration of acceptable hospitable accommodation varies likewise. In English, we may say, quoting a quip attributed to Benjamin Franklin, that “Guests, like fish, begin to smell after three days,” but similar sayings or proverbs can be found around the world. The adoption of the stranger is different from the act of hospitality. In Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* (Kant 1991 [1795]), hospitality in the sense of accommodating and assisting travellers is stated as a normative principle, but, of course, that does not entail the right of strangers to settle permanently. Not having witnessed waves of refugee movement, something his hometown of Königsberg would experience exactly 150 years later, Kant – oblivious of or indifferent to European colonialism – presumably envisioned the stranger as a traveller passing through a clearly bounded city with a coherent and homogeneous settled citizenry.

Yet, the difference between transience and permanence is not as clear as it may seem at a first glance. In his seminal treatment of gift exchange, the anthropologist Marcel Mauss (2002 [1924]) chooses to use a lengthy quotation from *Hávamál* as an epigraph, selecting stanzas that emphasize the reciprocal nature of gifting. By offering and receiving gifts, Mauss argues throughout the book, one enters into a moral relationship of mutual obligations extending far beyond mere transactions, which may, in fact, be understood as foils for things that matter, namely peaceful or even friendly social relations.

It is not intrinsic to the present argument that *Hávamál* and *The Elder Edda* (of which it forms part) happen to be Norse poetry, but this essay and the rest of the present book raise questions pertaining to the Nordic style of hospitality, asking about its cultural, religious, social, and historical contexts in order to make sense of its present forms. Let me quote a Norwegian vignette before returning to the general subject of hospitality.

In an analysis of food consumption and exchange in the everyday life of a village on the southeastern seaboard of Norway, the social anthropologist Runar Døving (2001, 2003) develops some subtle insights into the dynamics of hospitality. Describing the conventions of social visits in the community, he asks what the reactions would be if a guest insisted on not being served anything but a glass of water. Convention dictates that coffee be served on these visits, usually along with a slice of cake or a plate of sweet biscuits.

In Norway, “a glass of water” usually refers to tap water, which is, in effect, understood as being tantamount to *nothing*. “Water,” Døving notes (2003, 30, my translation), “is something one tends to think of as free. It is categorized as an unlimited good.” Referring to the Biblical myth in which Jesus transformed water into wine, Døving notes that water was not seen as fit for wedding guests in ancient Galilee either.

By refusing to imbibe anything but water, the guest effectively refuses to accept the host’s offer of reciprocity, thereby rejecting an offer of engaging in a relationship of mutual moral commitment. Thus, the host has a culturally sanctioned right to feel offended.

The late Eduardo Archetti, an Argentine anthropologist who settled in Norway in the early 1970s and remained there until his death in 2005, occasionally commented on the inclination toward the balanced reciprocity so characteristic of civil society in Norway. If he bought a colleague a cup of coffee in the canteen, he said, the colleague would immediately pay him for the coffee. Rather than entering into a long-term relationship of small gift exchanges, the colleague would “settle his debt” there and then. This fear of intimacy prevented, in Archetti’s interpretation, the glue of civil society from thickening.

By refusing to accept a gift, one effectively rejects the other person’s offer of potential friendship. In Mauss’ analysis, the institution of gift exchange (be it material or immaterial) consists of three elements: (1) the obligation to give, (2) the obligation to receive, and (3) the obligation to offer a return gift. The fulfilment of these three elements ensures that respect is confirmed and that trust can develop.

One can be a disgraceful guest, on the other hand, by demanding too much or indeed too little of the host, as in the case of the guest who refuses any gift beyond a glass of water. However, one can also be a disgraceful host by not showing any interest in one’s guests’ wellbeing. A host can serve the most sumptuous dishes, but little is gained if they fail to listen to the guest’s conversation or accept an offer of a return visit. In such a situation, the guest leaves humiliated.

In rich countries, many refugees and immigrants feel this way about their relationship to the host society. The refugees have been offered shelter and food, for which they are grateful, and they now wish to reciprocate by doing something in return. They are often denied the right to do so, even more so during the coronavirus crisis, which has limited mobility and interpersonal contact to a minimum. Right-wing populists of every political shade sometimes argue the need to “place demands on immigrants.” This kind of formulation turns the problem on its head and reveals a poor understanding of the dynamics of reciprocity. In fact, there is nothing immigrants want more than having “demands placed upon,” which would indicate that they are *needed*, that someone out there cherishes their contribution to society. I have met asylum-seekers at detention centers who have spent months waiting for a decision. They are grateful to Norwegian society for having given them protection, but they have one big wish: to be allowed to do something useful.

King Carl XIV Johan of Sweden and Norway (1763–1844) was an immigrant from France. Born Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, he never learnt to speak Swedish, but his motto, inscribed on the pedestal of his equestrian statue in front of Oslo's royal castle, tells of the aspirations of many immigrants: "The love of the people – my reward" – *Folkets kärlek, min belöning*. Carl Johan struggled hard – and largely unsuccessfully – to gain the love of his people, but he succeeded well enough in the Norwegian part of the kingdom for the main avenue of Christiania (now Oslo) to be named for him after his death.

With a few exceptions, in recent years, immigration policies in Europe have tended to be based on suspicion, hostility, or indifference. A truly hospitable attitude would encourage a situation where minorities were able to gain the love of the people through their own worthy efforts. This demands of the majority that they do not insist on "just a glass of water" when offered something from the minorities. A lack of interest in one's guests may, in fact, be a more serious impediment to the successful integration of immigrants than what is commonly assumed. This attitude is a recipe for the development of asymmetrical relationships where humiliation may take over from gratitude, pity segueing into contempt. In the limbo of the coronavirus crisis, reciprocating has become even more difficult than before. And how do you integrate into a society where interpersonal contact is perceived as a potential danger to health and well-being?

The term "integration," the way it is customarily used in the Scandinavian languages, exclusively refers to the integration of foreigners or citizens with foreign-born parents. To this, one may object that, in fact, *everybody* deserves the right to be integrated into a society, not just minorities; but that is not a theme I shall pursue further here. The point is that "integration" is virtually used as a synonym for "assimilation." It does not entail a reciprocal relationship between two parties on an equal footing, but a one-way transfer of cultural values, skills, and social practices from a majority to a minority, or from a settled population to itinerant newcomers. This cultural grammar presupposes not only power asymmetries, but also the existence of a sharp, unquestioned boundary between the self and the other, quite unlike the situation in many other societies, such as Creole societies (Eriksen 2020), where the boundary itself is continuously being destabilized by people's movement, cultural flows, and social change.

### The power of the gift

There are historical precedents for the characteristically Scandinavian approach to integration. The missionary movement in Lutheran Norway can be traced back to the early eighteenth century and the missionary expeditions to pagan Greenland (the key figure here being Hans Egede, "The Apostle of Greenland"). But it really took off in the direction of India and Madagascar in the nineteenth century and boomed in the twentieth century with myriad local missionary associations across the country and a plethora of missionary stations overseas (cf. Gullestad 2007 for an account of Norwegian missionaries in Cameroon).

The aim, apart from converting locals to Lutheran Christianity, consisted of “civilizing” the natives, so that missionary stations were increasingly involved in developmental work, and some were even equipped with dispensaries, schools, and workshops apart from, naturally, the ubiquitous chapel. Growing up in the 1970s, I remember visits to our primary school by missionaries who were home from Madagascar, speaking with the soft consonants of the South Norwegian accent stereotypically associated with religious piety and showing slides from the Malagasy countryside. Their message was that rural Malagasy were to be pitied not only because they had not heard about Jesus Christ, but also because of their primitive culture and material poverty. As far as I remember, they said nothing about the possibility of learning anything worthwhile *from* the Malagasy.

A close affinity between missionary activities and development aid has existed since the beginning of the latter following World War II. Indeed, one of the largest development NGOs in the country, *Kirkens Nødhjelp* (Norwegian Church Aid), was traditionally linked with the state Lutheran Church. However, Norwegian development aid has been more closely affiliated with the social-democratic state and the labour movement, expressing a desire to extend solidarity to poor countries. The logic of reciprocity characterizing the missions can nevertheless easily be found in development programmes and organizations. The emphasis is consistently on giving rather than receiving, thereby creating the same kind of asymmetry that could be observed in the missionary associations and, today, in programmes intending to help integrate immigrants. An excellent discourse analysis of Norwegian developmental policy is Knut Nustad’s *Gavens makt* (“The power of the gift,” Nustad 2003), which shows how power asymmetries are being reproduced by the lopsided gift economy characterizing development assistance.

The refusal to receive is an often-underestimated source of humiliation. Soldiers representing the occupying forces in Afghanistan have for years been instructed not ever to buy fruit in the market. Instructed to take their precautions, troops from the rich countries bring their own food. One is reminded of the apocryphal story about Bill Clinton who, when visiting Bangladesh during his presidency, is said to have brought everything, down to his bathing water, from home. Being a disgraceful guest is scarcely more productive of mutual trust and respect than being a disgraceful host.

Hospitality, in other words, relies on the observance of the simple rules of reciprocity, which, when followed, engender trust and respect and may develop into long-term commitments. Yet, giving and receiving in a mutually bonding fashion, so crucial in both social and intercultural relationships, presuppose a social ontology where difference is not seen as a threat, and where the world is acknowledged to be a complex web of interlocking cultural worlds. I now turn to this issue – the problem of cosmopolitanism, its pernicious cousin (identity politics), and its opposite (imperialism). If hospitality is a form of reciprocity, it has to be reciprocal to function. Otherwise, it reproduces and strengthens symbolic power inequalities. As I have argued, Scandinavians can be rather generous givers, but poor receivers in encounters with strangers. It is therefore necessary to take a careful look at the ecology of communication involving Scandinavians and their strangers.

## Respect as a scarce resource

Given that the current regime of the USA is not easily given to ambivalence, it is an ironic fact that the perhaps two most influential ideological thinkers of the American right from the late twentieth century were both partly correct in their analyses of symbolic power, although they were wrong in crucial respects. Both were authors of widely distributed books about the “new world order,” and both were keenly listened to in circles near the White House. However, they seemed to be saying opposite things.

At the time, Francis Fukuyama (1992) argued that Western democracy is the only game in town worthy of the name and that global politics nowadays simply consists of attempts, by the less unfortunate nations, to achieve the same levels of consumption and the liberal rights like those enjoyed by Americans. In this context, he also argues that the quest for recognition is fundamental and accounts for various forms of identity politics. Samuel Huntington (1996), on the other hand, argued that current and future conflicts will take place not between ideologies, but between “civilizations,” that is, related clusters of cultures, such as the West, Islam, Hinduism, and Eastern Christianity. Both Fukuyama and Huntington were at the time severely criticized by academics and other intellectuals and this is not the place to repeat all the criticisms. On the contrary, I would argue that they were both partly right. Fukuyama was right to assume that recognition by others is a notoriously scarce resource in the contemporary world, but he was wrong to believe that recognition can be achieved only through the successful adoption of Western values and ways of life. Importantly and laudably, he modified his views later, notably in his book *Identity* (Fukuyama 2018). Huntington was correct in saying that cultural differences are important, but he was hopelessly off the mark when trying to map out those differences: His concept of civilizations was as theoretically inconsistent as it was empirically misleading and there is also no reason to assume that such differences necessarily lead to conflict. In fact, it was argued at the time that *none* of the armed conflicts of the 1990s were consistent with Huntington’s predictions (Fox 2000).

We must nonetheless concede that these influential American thinkers, notwithstanding their close ties to a major imperial power, correctly claimed that recognition and respect are important, and that cultural differences matter in politics. This double insight, crucial to an understanding of hospitality across cultural differences, resonates surprisingly loudly with a very different trajectory in recent intellectual discourse, namely postcolonial theory. According to writers like Frantz Fanon, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, and Edward Said, the most difficult form of decolonization consists of purging the mind of imperial categories and prejudices (Ngũgĩ 1985); that is to say, developing a self, and an identity, and a self-awareness that are not confined to the frame of mind imposed by the colonizers. The sound of one-hand clapping emerging from the asymmetrical exchange relations between Scandinavians and strangers indicates the need for this kind of perspective. The antagonistic view typical of the ongoing “war on terror” represents the

opposite of a cosmopolitan position based on trust and the laws of gift exchange, and this way of thinking has had repercussions in many parts of our societies, from humiliating security checks in airports to earnest debates about the possible incompatibility of Islam and democracy. The postcolonial view, by contrast, insists on equality and mutual respect across differences. And it may yet contribute to changing the often fraught host–guest relationship prevalent in the Nordic countries.

### **Asymmetrical exchange**

The disgraceful host, I have claimed, is one who does not care about the guests. You invite them into your home, you feed them, you show them around, but neglect to ask them a single question about themselves or to accept an invitation for a return visit. This, I have argued, moreover, is the typical template for missions, aid, and the integration of immigrants. This cultural propensity to give rather than receive is evident on a national scale in Norway every year, during the annual “TV campaign,” a charity event broadcast on state television, where every Norwegian household should ideally be visited by a volunteer and have the opportunity to gift money to an NGO or a designated cause overseas. Sometimes described as the “national championship of generosity,” the TV programme compares council areas, eventually announcing a winner: the municipality with the highest sum per capita.

The one-sidedness of Norwegian generosity is likely connected to the considerable economic wealth of the country, which in effect has turned the rest of the world into so many tourist destinations for Norwegians. The notion that foreigners should be welcomed into the country for their potential contributions to the wellbeing of Norwegians is now an alien one, unlike the historical attitude to immigration in the USA and Canada, where immigrants were assumed to bring necessary skills and competence to the country. An author from an African country who spent 2 years as an invited author in a city of refuge under the auspices of ICORN (International Cities of Refuge Network) told me that he had a strong wish to make a contribution as an expression of gratitude when he arrived. He offered to write something for the city theater, perhaps make a public reading, or take part in networks pertaining to literature or other cultural events, but felt that he was met with polite indifference – not, incidentally, an uncommon feeling among foreigners who come to Norway. He expressed a comparable view to that of the asylum-seeker I met at a reception center years ago, who praised Norway for having offered him refuge and security, but who wished to reciprocate. However, no options enabled him to do so, even if he had been willing to perform any menial task around the asylum center, such as painting a fence or mowing the lawn.

On second thought, what I just said is not entirely correct: Labour migrants from EU countries, notably Poland and Lithuania, are on the whole welcomed for their contributions to the wellbeing of Norwegians, as they work in sectors

such as construction, house-painting, and repairs, and are perceived to provide high-quality work at a decent price.

Yet the problem of asymmetrical exchange remains for asylum-seekers, and it has arguably been exacerbated in Norway since the implementation of a stricter immigration policy since the early 2010s, which has made it increasingly difficult for refugees to obtain asylum. The situation in all Scandinavian countries has changed since the 1990s, when their asylum policies were quite generous. The Danes were the first to implement restrictions, immediately following the elections in 2001. Norway followed suit and established a strict policy on asylum long before the right-wing populist Progress Party was invited to govern the country with the Conservatives. In Sweden, more restrictive policies were implemented only after the Syrian refugee crisis of 2015–2016, when Sweden and Germany were the only European countries signaling that this was, in fact, a crisis affecting not “us,” but “them.” Many Swedes and Germans would later feel betrayed by the rest of the European Union, which did not follow their example.

Asylum-seekers are technically not yet guests, kept in the waiting room until they have received a decision for their application. Indeed, what characterizes the life of the refugee is not the flight as such, but the often long periods of waiting, sometimes for indeterminate periods (Jacobsen, Karlsen and Khosravi in press). This does not preclude hospitality on the part of the host population since they are often free to move about (but not to work). For people who are not allowed to work and who have so far received little from official Norway, entering into long-term relations of reciprocity can be difficult but not impossible. In December 2019, the ex-Bishop of Oslo, Gunnar Stålsett, was sentenced to 45 days’ conditional prison sentence for having employed an asylum-seeker who had no legal right to work. Voluntary organizations also run projects for asylum-seekers, yet their situation is naturally precarious.

The welfare state is a membership organization with specified criteria for membership. Those who are caught in limbo between not belonging and belonging need to understand this limitation, whether or not they agree with the criteria. Hospitality, to the extent that it is being practiced, holds out no guarantee for permanence, as theorists of hospitality from Kant to Derrida (2001, see also Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000, Claviez 2013) have argued. At the same time, denying the guest the basic needs and recognition of their humanity by refusing them entry violates the very same basic norms. This principle, under constant challenge and increased criticism, is naturally under even more severe threat as a result of the Coronavirus pandemic.

### **A Scandinavian form of hospitality?**

What, then, *is* characteristic of the Nordic, Scandinavian, or Norwegian style of hospitality – if anything? In the first part of this chapter, I identified the problem of asymmetrical reciprocity and pointed out that it reproduces unequal symbolic power as well as other forms of inequalities, reiterating the narratives from

colonialism according to which white people's skills and knowledge should ideally replace their local counterparts for development to take place. There are three other factors that we should take into account.

The climatic factor is often invoked in comparisons between public life in Northern and Southern Europe and this comparison stands to reason. In the cold countries, most of the year there can be no *piazza* where people can meet informally, even if fleetingly. By this token, it may be said that Scandinavians were better prepared for the Coronavirus lockdown than southern Europeans, who were accustomed to spending much of their time outside their homes. The boundary between the private and the public sphere is stark and crisp in countries where the temperature is below freezing point for several months every year. 250 years after Montesquieu, few serious scholars take climatic determinism at face value; but as a factor shaping and limiting possibilities for social life, it must be taken into account. In Scandinavia, a considerable proportion of life takes place indoors, frequently at home. The quotidian encounters on the street described by Gilroy (2004) and elaborated ethnographically by Wessendorf (2015), which form the basis of conviviality in urban settings, rarely occur when people are forced to wear polar outfits to go shopping. The spontaneous situations enabling people to exchange niceties and small acts of reciprocity are difficult to create under such circumstances. On a bitterly cold early winter day in the early 1990s, I visited the village of Oppdal, in a mountainous area some 200 kilometers south of Trondheim, where I met some recently arrived Bosnian refugees who were temporarily and provisionally lodged in a resort hotel intended for skiing enthusiasts. Coming from cities like Sarajevo and Mostar, the Bosnians found it difficult to connect with the local community. There were few, if any, public places where locals typically hung out. There was a newly established "international café" in the village center, where coffee, chessboards, and foreign newspapers were available. However, they told me, the only people who went there were Bosnians, so it did not really function as a meeting place between locals and newcomers.

The second limiting factor which needs to be mentioned is kinship organization. Unlike in many parts of the world, the nuclear family forms the pillar of Norwegian society. The local social organization gravitates around institutions and activities engaged in by nuclear families (which may be one-parent units but nevertheless revolve around children's activities). Foreigners may be surprised to learn that Norwegians often leave work early and may disappear for hours at the time at certain times of the year owing to events in kindergarten or school involving their children, aware that they will be seen as inadequate parents if they do not. Norwegians typically spend the weekend with their families or spouses, many leaving the workplace early on Fridays to make the most of their days off. This cultural value makes informal interaction with others complicated.

Unlike in those parts of the world, where the lineage organization remains essential, the central social bond in Norwegian society is the conjugal tie between spouses. If a Sicilian man dies, he would typically be buried next to his father; when a Norwegian man dies, he will be buried next to his wife or parents. At a

time when most individuals of both genders have waged work, implying that the women are economically independent, the ties that bind spouses are emotional and connected to their progeny. When a childless couple divorces, their friends would typically say that, after all, it was a relief that they didn't have children. Norway, like the other Nordic countries, is a very child-oriented society where having children offers a shortcut into a number of social contexts, provided they are properly enrolled in such public institutions as kindergartens and schools (Lynnebakke 2020). Countless times the quintessential Norwegian parent has eaten tangerines and gingerbread cookies with other parents before Christmas or taken part in raffles for the school marching band on a spring Sunday, simply by virtue of living in the same place as others and having children in the same public institutions. Those who do not find themselves in this privileged situation have far fewer entry points or arenas for making transactions and communication.

Third and finally, it is necessary to point out the significance of religion, which has been hovering over this chapter without being treated systematically until now. As observed by the Catholic Archetti earlier in this chapter, on the whole, Norwegians are worried about incurring debts of gratitude, while in other parts of the world, this is exactly how the glue of social life creates lasting relationships of mutual reciprocity. The cultural preference for balanced reciprocity, that is, immediate returns of gifts or favours (Sahlins 1972), militates against the establishment of enduring relationships of mutual moral obligations. The question is to what extent this cultural propensity is related to religion.

Unlike Catholicism and most varieties of Islam, Protestantism preaches a direct and personal relationship between the individual and God. In one of the foundational texts in sociology, Durkheim (2002 [1897]) argued that the higher suicide incidence among Protestants than Catholics was causally linked to the individualism, viz., lack of a strong, caring community, entailed by the severing of ties between person and congregation implied by the lack of communion and confession in front of a priest. Among Protestants, the individual is on his own in a fundamental sense, which – in Durkheim's analysis – creates conditions for alienation, loneliness, and anomie – conditions for the kind of suicide he deems the most common one in France.

The individualism encouraged by Protestantism – the Bible, having been translated into the vernacular eliminated the need for a priestly exegesis; the emotional, personal commitment to the God is not mediated by ritualistic exercises – is easy to identify in contemporary Scandinavia regardless of religious commitment or belief. Egalitarian individualism, a term coined by Marianne Gullestad (1991) to describe a peculiar Norwegian concept of personhood (shared, arguably, across the Nordic region), produces (again according to Gullestad) the paradoxical kind of person who insists on sameness as well as individuality. As famously caricatured in Monty Python's *Life of Brian*, a large crowd of mostly men bellow, having been told by their prophet that they are all individuals: "We are all individuals!" (You may recall that one dissenting voice objects: "I'm not!") This individualism, rooted in Lutheran liturgy, is historically connected with

the transition from the lineage society characteristic of Viking and Medieval Scandinavia to the society founded in the nuclear family where matrimony was usually considered an alliance between two individuals rather than two lineages (Solheim 2012). Unlike in the lineage society that produced *Hávamál*, hospitality in the nuclear family-based society did not involve an assortment of relatives, but only the household. So, the threshold (literally) of the home became a decisive boundary. Recall the story about coffee and “just a glass of water” from Runar Døving from the beginning of this essay: The uncomfortable guest is now hostage (an interesting etymological relative of ‘host’ and “hospitality,” like “hostility”) to a household where they do not feel at ease, thus minimizing the expenses of the host in order not to incur an unrepayable debt of gratitude. Being allowed to cross the threshold of a private home in Scandinavia signals trust and an invitation to enter into an enduring relationship of morally binding reciprocity. As all Scandinavians know, having been invited to someone’s home implies the duty to return the invitation, in accordance with Mauss’ tripartite definition of the gift and Lutheran morality. This may be a reason why refugees rarely see the inside of a Norwegian home and it speaks volumes about the possibilities and limitations of Scandinavian hospitality. During the Coronavirus lockdown, the domesticity and balanced reciprocity dominating in Norwegian everyday life may have been an advantage for settled Norwegians, but an impediment for all newcomers. Lacking reciprocal ties with Norwegian individuals or families, they were now left with even fewer arenas in which to establish such relationships than before.

## References

- Thomas, Claviez. 2013. *The Conditions of Hospitality: Ethics, Politics and Aesthetics on the Threshold of the Possible*. New York: Fordham.
- Derrida, Jacques. 2001. *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*. London: Routledge.
- Derrida, Jacques and Anne Dufourmantelle. 2000. *Of Hospitality: Anne Dufourmantelle Invites Jacques Derrida to Respond*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Døving, Runar. 2001. “Vaffelhjertets makt – en Analyse av norske kvinners hushold” (The Power of The Waffle Heart – An Analysis of The Households of Norwegian Women). In *Varene tar makten*, edited by Siri Meyer and Erling Dokk Holm, 151–190. Oslo: Ad Notam Gyldendal.
- Døving, Runar. 2003. *Rype med lettøl. En etnografi fra Norge (Grouse with Light Beer. An Ethnography from Norway)*. Oslo: Pax.
- Durkheim, Emile. 2002 [1897]. *Suicide*. London: Routledge.
- Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. 2020. “Creolisation as a recipe for conviviality.” In *Conviviality at the Crossroads: The Poetics and Politics of Everyday Encounters*, edited by Oscar Hemer, Maja Povrzanović Frykman and Per-Markku Ristilampi, 43–64. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Fox, Jonathan. 2000. “Clash of Civilizations or Clash of Religions: Which is a More Important Determinant of Ethnic Conflict?” *Ethnicities*, 1 (3), 295–366.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Avon.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 2018. *Identity*. London: Profile.

- Gilroy, Paul. 2004. *After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture*. London: Routledge.
- Gullestad, Marianne. 1991. "The Scandinavian Version of Egalitarian Individualism." *Ethnologia Scandinavica*, 21: 3–17.
- Gullestad, Marianne. 2007. *Misjonsbilder: Bidrag til norsk selvforståelse (Missionary Images: A Contribution to a Norwegian Self-Awareness)*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of a World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Jacobsen, Christine M., Marry-Anne Karlsen and Shahram Khosravi, eds (in press). *WAIT: Unpacking the temporalities of irregular migration*. London: Routledge.
- Kant, Immanuel. 1795 [1795]. "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch." In *Political Writings*, 93–130. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Lynnebakke, Brit (2020) *Belonging, inclusion and local identity. A study on internal and international in-migration in three Norwegian rural municipalities*. PhD dissertation, University of Oslo.
- Mauss, Marcel. 2002 [1924]. *The Gift*. London: Routledge.
- wa Thiong'o, Ngugi. 1985. *Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature*. London: Heinemann.
- Nustad, Knut. 2003. *Gavens makt: Norsk utviklingshjelp som formynderskap (The Power of the Gift: Norwegian Foreign Aid as Guardianship)*. Oslo: Pax.
- Sahlins, Marshall D. 1972. *Stone Age Economics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Solheim, Jorun. 2012. "Den nord-vest-europeiske Modellen. Norsk familiekultur i historisk og komparativt perspektiv" (The North West European Model: Norwegian Family Culture in Historical and Comparative Perspective). In *Velferdsstatens familier. Nye sosiologiske perspektiver*, edited by Anne Lise Ellingsæter and Karin Widerberg, 31–54. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk.
- Wessendorf, Susanne. 2014. *Commonplace Diversity: Social Relations in a Super-Diverse Context*. London: Palgrave.